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MICHAEL C. BLUMM*

NEPA Meets the Northwest Power
Act (And Prevails): The Ninth
Circuit Orders an EIS on the
Bonneville Power Administration's
Power Sale Contractst
A principal purpose of the 1980 Northwest Power Act' was to reallocate
the Bonneville Power Administration's (BPA) 2 low-cost hydropower among
competing user groups, thereby averting what might have become a regional "civil war." 3 With electric power shortfalls apparently imminent, 4
the Act directed BPA to offer new long-term power contracts to its cus*Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School; B.A. 1972, Williams College; LL.M. 1979,
J.D., 1976, George Washington University.
tAn earlier version of this article appeared in 28 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO, a publication
of the Natural Resources Law Institute at Lewis & Clark Law School. Publication of the MEMO is
due to the support of the Oregon State University Sea Grant College Program under a grant from
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); copies are available from the Natural
Resources Law Institute, Lewis & Clark Law School, 10015 S.W.Terwilliger Blvd., Portland OR
97219. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of NOAA or the U.S. govemnment. Owen Schmidt, Bonneville Power Administration attorney, supplied critical comments on
a draft of this article. Karen S. Frank, first-year student, Lewis & Clark Law School, provided able
editorial assistance.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§839-839h (1982).
2. A self-financing federal agency within the Department of Energy, BPA is the Northwest's
federal electric power wholesaler, created by the 1937 Bonneville Project Act, 16 U.S.C. § 832
(1982), to market electric power produced by the Bonneville Dam. Today, BPA sells power generated
from some 28 federal hydroelectric projects and two nuclear power plants to nearly 150 utility and
industrial customers throughout the Northwest and in California. For an introduction to BPA and its
role in Northwest electric power policymaking, see G. NORWOOD, COLUMBIA RIVER POWER FOR THE
PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE POLICIES OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION (1981); BONNEVILLE

POWER ADMIN., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE ROLE OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMINISTRATION IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, INCLUDING ITS PARTICIPATION
IN A HYDRO-THERMAL POWER PROGRAM (1980); see also Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric

Heritage: Prologue to the Pacific Northwest's Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 58
WASH. L. REV. 175 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hydroelectric Heritage].
3. See Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1984). This "war" would
have been fought largely in the courts. Its motivating force would have been the great electric rate
disparities among Northwest utilities in the 1970s. For example, the 1978 retail rate paid by consumers
served by Portland General Electric (PGE), an invester-owned utility denied access to BPA power
since 1973, was $27 for 1000 kilowatt-hours, while consumers served by Clark County Public Utility
District (a BPA preference customer), serving Vancouver, Washington, across the Columbia River
from Portland, paid only $11.10 for the same amount of power. See K. LEE, D. KLEMKA & M. MARTS,
ELECTRIC POWER AND THE FtrrEna OF THE PACIFC NORTHWEST 282 n. 16 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
K. LEE] (also noting that in 1971 PGE retail rates were more than five times the federal wholesale
rate, while Clark County's rate was about three times less than the federal wholesale price). These
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tomers within nine months of its enactment. 5 It then gave the customers
another full year to accept or reject the contract offers. 6
Implementation of these directives quickly became controversial. Procedurally, BPA chose not to perform an environmental impact statement
(EIS) on the contracts, claiming in an "Environmental Report" that (1)
the decision to offer the contracts was a nondiscretionary duty exempt
from EIS requirements; (2) it was impossible to negotiate a contract while
preparing an EIS; and (3) there was insufficient time to prepare an EIS. 7
disparities prompted the Oregon legislature to enact a statute authorizing the governor to create a
statewide public utility, the Domestic and Rural Power Authority, to claim access to BPA power if
rates were not substantially equalized by 1979. See S.B. 320, chap. 888 Or. Laws (1977) amending
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 308.505 and 758.215 (1977). If this utility were established by the governor,
"the fight for federal hydro would be on, a fight that could destroy the fabric of [regional] interdependence." K. LEE, supra at 131. See also Balmer, From Symbiosis to Synergy: A Case Study of
Public and Private Electric Power in the Pacific Northwest, 13 ENVTL. L. 637, 655 (1983).
Section 5(c) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839c(c) reduced rate disparities between
Northwest public and private utilities by authorizing an "exchange" of power between BPA and
private utilities, enabling residential and small farm consumers served by private utilities to enjoy
some of the benefits of low cost federal hydropower. Under the exchange, private utilities trade their
higher cost electric power at "average system cost" for an equivalent amount of lower cost BPA
power. See Mellum, Darkness to Dawn? Generating and Conserving Electricity in the Pacific
Northwest: A Primeron the Northwest PowerAct, 58 WASH. L. REV. 245, 253 nn.61-62 (1983).
4. As late as March 1980, the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committtee (a coalition of
Northwest utility and industrial customers of BPA) projected an 80% probability of regional deficit
by 1984-85, and a 98% probability of deficit by 1989-90. See Jackson, The PacificNorthwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act-Solution for a Regional Dilemma, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 7, 8 n.6 (1980) (citing PACIFIC NORTHWEST UTILITIES CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, WEST GROUP
FORECAST OF POWER LOADS AND RESOURCES, JULY 1980-JUNE 1981, SUMMARY I- 15 (March 1980)).
These forecasts were, of course, completely wrong, although certainly not unprecedented. See
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, CHOOSING AN ELECTRICAL ENERGY FUTURE FOR THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST: AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO 234 (1980) (noting the actual 1978 electric demands were

over 20% lower than predicted ten years earlier). Today, instead of shortages, the region faces
sustained surpluses into the 1990s. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, FORECASTS OF ELECTRIC CONSUMPTION INTHE PACIFIC NORTHWEST 1980-2000 at 5 (June 1982) (predicting
average annual growth of 1.6%); NORTHWEST POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, NORTHWEST CONSERVATION
AND ELECTRIC POWER PLAN 4-2 (1983) (growth forecasts ranging from 0.7% to 2.5% annually).
The uncertainty in electric forecasting is a reflection of the increasing difficulty of projecting
economic and demographic trends, as well as rapidly escalating Northwest power rates. See Lee,
The Path Along the Ridge: Regional Planning in the Face of Uncertainty, 58 WASH. L. REV. 317,
321 (1983). Nevertheless, forecasting errors are invariably overestimates of demand, not underestimates, largely because utilities perceive greater costs from power shortages than from having excess
generating capacity. See Michie, Impacts of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act on the Development of Energy Resources in the Pacific Northwest: An Analysis of
the Resource Acquisition Priority Scheme, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 299, 299-304 (1981) (describing the logic of "Pascal's Wager").
5. Northwest Power Act, § 5(g)(l), 16 U.S.C. § 839(g) (1982).
6. Id. § 5(g)(2), 16 U.S.C. §839c(g)(2) (1982).
7. See infra notes 42, 45-47 and accompanying text. During the ensuing litigation, BPA deemphasized the claim that it was impossible to negotiate a contract and perform an EIS at the same
time; emphasized the infeasibility of performing an EIS in the statutorily allotted time, and claimed
that the issuance of power sale contracts, as a matter of law, had no effect on the environment. See
infra notes 46, 70. BPA prepared the "Environmental Report" to fulfill the non-EIS provisions of
NEPA and the general environmental policies of the Northwest Power Act. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY,
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT PREPARED TO ACCOMPANY THE FINAL POWER
SALES AND RESIDENT EXCHANGE CONTRACTS 1-7 (Sept. 1981) [hereinafter cited as BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT].
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Substantively, BPA rejected a number of recommended contract conditions aimed at ensuring that the contracts helped to fulfill the Act's conservation and fish and wildlife goals.8
In protest, Forelaws on Board, 9 an Oregon-based environmental group,
brought suit against BPA, alleging that the power agency's failure to
perform an EIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 0
Although delayed by troublesome jurisdictional questionsl on September
25, 1984, over three years after the contracts were offered, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled, in Forelaws on Board v. Johnson (Forelaws H)12that BPA had in fact violated NEPA and ordered the agency to
write an EIS on the contracts.
The court rejected BPA's assertion that the power sale contracts involved no issues of environmental significance 3 and also refused the
agency's contention that the time deadlines in the Northwest Power Act
constituted an implied waiver of EIS requirements. 4 Aided by the Northwest Power Act directive that it be construed "consistent with applicable
environmental laws,"' 5 as well as the Act's "clear . .. emphasis on
environmental concerns," 16 the Ninth Circuit determined that any conflict
between the time afforded for contract offers and NEPA requirements was
due to BPA's interpretation, and not to any irreconcilable conflict between
the statutes.17 Because the agency's interpretation would have frustrated
NEPA compliance, the court gave little deference to BPA's construction
of the Act.' 8 But finding "a clear tension" between the 1980 Act's time
8. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 36, 75-76 and accompanying
text.
9. "Forelaws on Board" is a reference to Barry Commoner's four laws of ecology. See B.
COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRcLE (1971). Originally, the National Wildlife Federation and several
other environmental groups were also plaintiffs, but they decided not to pursue the case after the
trial court decision, infra note 60.
10. 42 U.S.C. §4321A (1982).
11. See infra section entitled The Jurisdictional Quagmire.
12. 743 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984). In the first Forelaws on Board v. Johnson case, 709 F.2d 1310
(9th Cir. 1983) (Forelaws I), the Ninth Circuit determined that it, not the district courts, has
jurisdiction over NEPA suits challenging actions unnder the Northwest Power Act. See infra notes
60-61 and accompanying text.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 73-78.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 79-93.
15. See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying note 84.
17. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
18. The prospect of frustrating NEPA compliance distinguishes Forelaws on Board from the
Supreme Court's decision in Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist.,
-U.S.-.,
104 S.Ct. 2472 (1984), where the Court gave "great weight" to BPA's interpretation
of the Northwest Power Act's allocation of power entitlements. Because NEPA's fundamental purpose
is to restructure agency decisionmaking to produce greater sensitivity to environmental concerns,
no agency should be considered an expert agency in terms of NEPA compliance (see infra note 83).
Typically, the courts liberally construe NEPA's provisions. See, e.g., F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECrION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK § 2.21 (1981 & 1984 Supp.) (collecting cases). For divergent
perspectives on the Aluminum Co. of America decision, see Alexander, Aluminum Co. of America
v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District, 15 ENVTL. L. 325 (1985); Haagensen & Waldron,
Aluminum Co. ofAmerica v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District: Supreme Deference to Appellate
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deadlines and the time necessary for EIS preparation, the court refused
to apply the Ninth Circuit presumption that the proper remedy for NEPA

violations is an injunction.

9

Instead of enjoining execution of the power

contracts, Judge Mary Schroeder let the contracts stand because she felt
that the existing contracts contained language sufficiently flexible to allow
for amendments in light of the results of the EIS she ordered.2
The result in Forelaws H was entirely predictable. In 1981, the Ninth
Circuit indicated that it would construe narrowly a NEPA exemption
created by the United States Supreme Court for alleged conflicts between
NEPA and other federal statutes. 2 In the Ninth Circuit, agencies are
excused from NEPA compliance only where they can demonstrate "clear
and unavoidable" statutory conflicts. 22 In view of the circuit's consistent
"hard look" standard of review in NEPA cases,2 3 it is not surprising that
the Forelaws II court was skeptical of BPA's allegations that it lacked
Advocacy, 15 ENVrL. L. 343 (1985); Redman, Statutory Construction in the Supreme Court: A
Northwest Power Act Example, 15 ENVTL. L. 353 (1985); Blumm, Aluminum Co. of America v.
Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District and Some Myths About Northwest Electric Power Policymaking: A Callfor Continued Judicial "HardLooks," 15 ENVTL. L. 365 (1985).
19. See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
21. In Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc. of Oklahoma, 426 U.S. 776 (1976),
the Supreme Court interpreted the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act's directive that disclosure
statements become effective 30 days after filing with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
to deprive the Secretary of the discretion to suspend the effective date of the statement to prepare
an EIS. The Court stated that "where a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists,
NEPA must give way." Id. at 788. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 502 F.2d 1154 (Temp. Emerg.
Ct. App. 1974) (EIS exemption implied in the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act's requirement
that the Federal Energy Office promulgate regulations within 15 days of passage of the Act).
22. Grindstone Butte Project v. Kleppe, 638 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981) (interpreting NEPA to give the Secretary of the Interior the discretion to impose
environmentally protective terms and conditions in irrigation rights-of-way permits across federal
lands, even though the original 1891 statute authorizing such rights-of-way contained no similar
provisions).
23. See W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 79 (1984 Supp.) (describing divergent
standards of judicial review as "hard looks," "soft glances," or "tempered gazes"). Marcel, The
Role of the Courts in a Legislative andAdministrativeLegal System-The Use of HardLook Review
in FederalEnvironmentalLitigation 62 Or. L. Rev. 403 (1983). Cf. Foundation for North American
Wild Sheep v. U.S., 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982)(holding a Forest Service decision not to prepare
an EIS on a special use permit that would have authorized reconstruction and use of a road directly
through a Bighorn Sheep lambing and calving area to be unreasonable); California v. Block, 690
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding the Forest Service's EIS on its Roadless Area Review Evaluation
II inadequate for failing to sufficiently describe site specific environmental effects and consider a
reasonable range of alternatives); Southern Oregon Citizens Against Toxic Sprays v. Clark, 720 F.2d
1475 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, .. _-U.S.-., 105 S. Ct. 446 (1984) (judging the adequacy of a
Bureau of Land Management "Environmental Assessment" on a herbicide spraying program by EIS
standards and enjoining the program pending preparation of a "worst case analysis"); Save Our
Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984) (enjoining the herbicide spraying programs of
both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management pending preparation of "worst case
analysis"); Yakima Indian Nation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n., 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir.
1984), cert denied, .... U.S.-, 105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985) (enjoining relicensing of the Rock Island
Dam for failure to perform an EIS); Thomas v. Petersen, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985) (enjoining
construction of a timber road pending preparation of an EIS on road construction and associated
timber harvesting).
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discretion over contract terms that could significantly affect the environment, or that it lacked sufficient time to prepare an EIS.24 Moreover,
given the strong environmental concerns expressed in the Power Act,25
the court's unwillingness to construe that statute to impliedly exempt BPA
from NEPA procedures seems sound.26
More surprising, and perhaps of more far-reaching consequence, was
the court's reason for ordering the EIS. Judge Schroeder ruled that the
Northwest Power Act's overriding concern with environmental protection
meant that BPA had to interpret the Act's nine month deadline for offering
the contracts in a way that would allow the agency to meet the deadline
and satisfy NEPA at the same time.27 She rejected the agency's contentions
that a "proposal" for NEPA purposes28 was not formulated until after six
months of negotiations between BPA and its utility and industrial customers.29 Breaking new NEPA ground, the court concluded that BPA's
failure to examine all significant alternatives violated not only NEPA,
but also the Administrative Procedure Act.3" In reaching this conclusion,
the court recognized that the chief concern of both NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act is the creation of pluralistic procedures in
which those affected by agency action have a full and fair opportunity to
present alternatives and have those alternatives examined rationally and
in writing by the agency.31
The forthcoming court-ordered EIS, if properly "scoped" 32 and forth24. Cf 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6 (NEPA regulation interpreting statutory directive of compliance "to
the fullest extent possible" in 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1982) to require agencies to comply with NEPA
unless existing law "expressly prohibits or makes compliance impossible"). Other courts have also
been skeptical of agency attempts to construe narrowly their organic authorities to avoid NEPA
requirements. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Mathews, 410 F. Supp. 336 (D.D.C. 1976);
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ely v. Velde(I), 451
F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971). Cf. Grindstone Butte Project v. Kleppe, 638 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1981)
cert denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); see generally J. BONINE & T. MCGARITY, THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CASES, LEGISLATION, POLICIES 43-44, 215-16 (1984).

Earlier, in the first suit brought under the Northwest Power Act, the Ninth Circuit held BPA's
narrow construction of its authorities under that statute to be unreasonable. Central Lincoln People's
Utility Dist. v. Johnson, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982). Although this result was overturned by the
Supreme Court in Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist., 104 S. Ct.
2472 (1984), see supra note 18, that case did not involve NEPA or a directive similar to NEPA's
directive of compliance "to the fullest extent possible."
25. See infra notes 71, 84 and accompanying text.
26. Cf. infra note 79 (NEPA "repeals by implication" are disfavored).
27. See infra text accompanying notes 83-90.
28. NEPA's EIS requirement attaches to "proposals for major federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C)(1982). See Kleppe v. Sierra Club,
427 U.S. 390 (1976).
29. Forelaws H1,743 F.2d at 684-85.
30. Id. at 685; see infra note 93.
31. Cf. infra note 105 and accompanying text.
32. Under the Council on Environmental Quality's NEPA regulations, to determine the proper
scope of an EIS, agencies must consider (1)connected, cumulative, and similar actions; (2) the "no
action" alternative, other reasonable courses of action, and mitigation measures; and (3) direct,
indirect, and cumulative impacts. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1984); see also infra note 119.
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rightly written will offer the public an opportunity to evaluate the effect
of BPA power sale policies on regional fish and wildlife restoration efforts
and conservation programs. Because the terms and conditions of power
sale contracts (especially industrial power contracts) affect operations at
hydroelectric projects, and therefore the quantity and timing of streamflows, they can have significant effects on fish and wildlife, particularly
on migrating anadromous fish.33 BPA has acknowledged these effects, 34
but has never systematically analyzed them.35 Similarly, power sale contract terms and conditions could contribute considerably to the efficacious
implementation of regional conservation programs.36 Exactly how fish
and wildlife and conservation concerns ought to be reflected in contract
terms and conditions should be a principal focus of the EIS. However,
given BPA's past reluctance to perform an EIS on these issues, the public
must play an active, informed role in the forthcoming scoping and commenting processes if the EIS is to become a vehicle ensuring that the
contracts foster these goals. This article aims to improve prospects of a
meaningful EIS on BPA's contracts by explaining both the issues at stake
before the Ninth Circuit as well as those that await resolution in the
forthcoming EIS process.

BACKGROUND
Described by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as a "unique piece
of regional energy legislation," 37 the Northwest Power Act was signed
into law on December 5, 1980.38 Section 5(g) of the Act required BPA
to offer new long-term contracts to its customers by September 5, 1981,
within nine months of the law's enactment.39 The customers were then
given a year to decide whether to accept the offer. The Act therefore
33. See generally Blumm, Hydropower vs. Salmon: The Struggle of the Pacific Northwest's
Anadromous Fish Runs for a Peaceful Coexistence With the FederalColumbia River Power System,
11 ENVTL. L. 211 (1981); see also Wandschneider, Managing River Systems: Centralization Versus
Decentralization, 24 NAT. RES. J. 1043, 1048-51 (1984).
34. BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 4-16 (noting that reservoir drafts to
serve industrial power loads may affect spring fish flows).
35. See Blumm, supra note 33, at 265-68; NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 10 ANADROMOUS
FISH LAW MEMO 7-9 (Oct. 1980) (arguing for an EIS on coordinated Columbia Basin hydroelectric
operations).
36. See BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-9 (suggestion of Natural Resources
Defense Council that BPA require as a power sale contract condition that customers participate in
conservation programs).
37. Forelaws H1,743 F.2d at 679 (citing Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist. v. Johnson, 735
F.2d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 1984)).
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (1982). For a variety of perspectives on the Act, see Symposium on
Energy Issues in the Pacific Northwest, 58 WASH L. REV. (No. 2, 1983) and Symposium on the
Northwest Power Act, 13 ENVTL. L. (Nos. 3 & 4, 1983).
39. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(1)(1982).

October 19851

NEPA MEETS NORTHWEST POWER ACT

envisioned a new system of contracts in place by September 5, 1982,
within twenty-one months of its effective date.4 °
Immediately after the statute's enactment, BPA began to negotiate with
its customers over the terms of new power sale contracts. Six months of
negotiations produced draft prototype contracts which, on June 11, 1981,
were made available for thirty days of public review.4' Although BPA
issued a draft "Environmental Report" (ER) along with the draft contracts, the agency refused to do a formal EIS, claiming that its obligation
to make contract offers was a non-discretionary duty imposed by Congress
and therefore exempt from EIS requirements." This claim was sharply
disputed by one publication,4 3 which contended that BPA's "ER" was no
substitute for an adequate EIS because it placed the burden on the public,
rather than BPA, to propose alternatives and mitigating measures."
Nevertheless, BPA proceeded to make contract offers on August 28,
1981 without an EIS,45 expanding its reasons for not doing so. The agency
40. Id. § 839c(g)(2) (1982); see Forelaws 1I, 743 F.2d at 680.
41. See Forelaws 1I, 743 F.2d at 684 (outlining BPA's activities between December 5, 1980 and
September 5, 1981).
42. BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT at 1-6 (June 1981): "[t]he offering of these new power sales contracts is a nondiscretionary duty imposed by Congress. Therefore,
the decision to offer the contracts is not subject to the preparation of an EIS under Section 102(2)(C)
of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)."

43. See

NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST.,

14 ANADROMOUS

FISH LAW MEMO 5

(July 1981):

It should be apparent, then, that the Act leaves BPA with considerable discretion to
make decisions that may result in long-term environmental impacts on the region. For
example, what if BPA's obligations under the new DSI contracts inhibit it from complying with a subsequently adopted fish and wildlife program or regional power plan?
Should not BPA be considering the insertion of clauses in the contracts to deal with
such contingencies? The many alternative forms the contracts may take-together with
their probable environmental impacts-should be considered and explored by BPA
through compliance with NEPA. It would seem most unlikely that Congress would
include expansive public participation provisions in the Act and, at the same time,
permit BPA to make long-range decisions affecting the entire region without involving
the public through NEPA's environmental impact statement process ...
Thus, the significant discretion BPA possesses in drafting the power supply contract
terms coupled with the potential long-range implications of the contracts, makes the
content of the contracts (as opposed to the decision to issue them) precisely the kind
of federal action that an EIS is designed to deal with. (Emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted).
44. The difference between an adequate EIS and an ER should be clearly understood. An EIS
requires a rigorous examination of alternative courses of action available to the agency, a comparative
evaluation of the anticipated environmental impacts of each alternative, an identification of the
environmentally-preferred alternative and any mitigation measures that can be taken, and a response
to all significant comments before proceeding with the chosen alternative. These requirements make
the agency more accountable to the public, produce more reasoned decisions, and result in less
exacting judicial review of agency action. BPA's ER, on the other hand, places the burden on the
public to come forward with alternative contract terms from those negotiated by the agency and its
customers, contains no comparative evaluation of environmental impacts of various alterantives,
identifies no environmentally preferred alternative, makes no mention of any mitigation measures
that may be available, and promises no specific responses to significant comments.
Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
45. 46 Fed. Reg. 44,340 (1981).
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claimed that the time deadlines imposed by the Northwest Power Act
impliedly exempted the contracts from EIS requirements.4 6 BPA also
asserted that "it is not 4 possible
to negotiate a contract and prepare an
7
EIS at the same time."
In terms of substantive contract provisions, BPA originally had seemed
to agree with its industrial customers that it possessed no authority to
include fish and wildlife protective language in the contracts.4 8 However,
in response to an uproar from the fish and wildlife protectionist community,49 BPA did include weak language protecting fish and wildlife in
the draft contract 0 and more forceful protective language in the final
offers.51 But the agency refused to include a condition suggested by the
National Marine Fisheries Service that would have required both BPA
and its customers to implement fish and wildlife measures as directed by
the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program. 52 BPA also rejected con46. BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at app. 3-10 (memorandum from Acting
Environmental Manager to BPA Administrator). This argument became BPA's principal defense
before the Ninth Circuit. See Brief of Federal Respondents in Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, No.
82-7119 (9th Cir.) at 11-28 [hereinafter cited as BPA Brief].
47. BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at app. 2-3.
48. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 14 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 8-9 (July 1981).
49. See id. at 6 (citing public dissatisfaction at the lack of fish and wildlife provisions).
50. See id. at 6-8 (critical examination of BPA's draft provisions).
51. See BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-8:
In meeting its obligation under this contract, Bonneville affirms its obligations under
Sections 4 and 6 of P.L. 96-501 and other applicable law with respect to implementation
of measures and objectives for the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and
wildlife while assuring the Pacific Northwest an adequate efficient economical and
reliable power supply. This contract shall not impair compliance with such obligations.
The Purchaser affirms its legal obligations related to fish and wildlife established in
any license or order issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This contract
shall not expand, impair, or in any way alter the Purchaser's legal obligations related
to fish and wildlife established in a license or order issued by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission.
52. See Letter from H.A. Larkins, Regional Director, National Marine Fisheries Service to Earl
Gjelde, Acting Administrator, Bonneville Power Administration, at 1-2 (March 4, 1981):
In carrying out the obligations under this contract, the parties also agree to implement
measures necessary for the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife
resources, particularly anadromous fish and their habitat. Necessary measures are those
which are established: (1) in a license or order issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission; (2) in the Section 4 power plan or the Section 4(h) fisheries program
established under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act; or (3) by the Administrator, upon the recommendation of a State or Federal fish
and wildlife agency or Indian tribe, in order to satisfy his obligations to protect,
mitigate, and enhance the fish and wildlife under the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act. Nothing in this contract shall be interpreted to prevent
or impair the implementation of measures for the protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and wildlife resources.
(Footnote omitted.) BPA did not respond to this language, or even acknowledge it, in its Environmental Report. Instead, the power agency wrote a letter apparently rejecting the language on the
basis of its (unsubstantiated) conclusion that both the fish and wildlife and power objectives of the
Northwest Power Act would be "best satisfied by planning for sufficient resources" and by taking
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servation provisions advocated by the Natural Resources Defense Council.53 The agency even deleted from its contracts a long-standing contract
provision protecting the scenic and water quality of the Columbia River
Gorge.54 Because all of these decisions were made without the benefit of
an EIS, Forelaws on Board filed suit.
THE JURISDICTIONAL QUAGMIRE
The merits of the suit were not decided quickly. The judicial review
provisions of the Northwest Power Act, which the Ninth Circuit described
as "unusual," 55 specify that challenges to "final agency actions" under
the Act must be filed in the Ninth Circuit, rather than in federal district
court.56 Although power sale contracts are defined as a final agency action, 57 Forelaws on Board did not allege that the contracts violated the
Act. Instead, the organization claimed a NEPA violation. Usually federal
district courts initially hear NEPA suits.58 However, the Northwest Power
Act did not make any reference to NEPA in its judicial review provisions."
Faced with these ambiguities, Forelaws, along with the National Wildlife Federation, filed suit in district court and, to preserve its case, also
attempted to file in the Ninth Circuit. On March 10, 1982, District Judge
James Redden ruled that the Northwest Power Act deprived him of jurisdiction over the case, and consequently the suit would have to be heard
in the appeals court.' ° A year later, on July 6, 1983, in Forelaws I the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court. The appeals court held it had
other steps "outside of the ongoing contract negotiations." Letter from Stanley E. Efferding, Bonneville Power Administration, to H.A. Larkins, National Marine Fisheries Service (March 27, 1981).
See NATURAL RESOURCS LAW INST., 14 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 3 (July 1981); BPA FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-7 to 2-9.
53. See BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-9 to 2-11.

54. See id. at 2-4 to 2-7. Despite recognizing that "the public is concerned that the environmental
damage in the prior general contract provisions ...

has not been strong enough ... [and] various

groups proposed language for BPA to include in the [contracts], including possible termination for
environmental noncompliance," BPA rejected restoring the strong 1938 and 1950 contract language:
"Unlike other Federal and state agencies, BPA is not authorized and does not wish to be put in the
position of having to monitor or enforce the customers' compliance with applicable environmental
laws." Id. at 2-5.
55. Forelaws !, 709 F.2d 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1983).
56. Northwest Power Act, § 9(e)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5) (1982).
57. Id. § 9(e)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(1)(B) (1982).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982) gives U.S. district courts jurisdiction over all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
59. However, § 9(e)(5) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839i(e)(5) (1982), refers to the
1937 Bonneville Project Act, the 1964 Northwest Preference Act, and the 1974 Federal Columbia
River Transmission System Act, as well as to the Northwest Power Act. Section 9(e)(5) also states
that challenges under other, unlisted provisions and statutes should be brought "in the appropriate
court." Id.
60. National Wildlife Federation v. Johnson, 548 F. Supp. 708 (D. Or. 1982), aff'd, 709 F.2d
1310 (9th Cir. 1983).
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jurisdiction because (1) the Northwest Power Act sought consolidated
and expedited judicial review, and (2) district court jurisdiction over NEPA
claims could produce judicial "bifurcation," causing "confusion, delay,
and potential for conflicting results." 6"
Although they ultimately did not affect the merits of the case, these
procedural decisions warrant some comment. While they may in fact
reflect a fair reading of the intent of the Northwest Power Act and recent
Supreme Court decisions, they create a nearly unworkable situation, as
the Ninth Circuit itself has recognized more than once.62 Appellate courts
are equipped to decide questions of law and procedure, but they are
poorly equipped to develop facts. Unfortunately, NEPA cases, especially
those involving the question of whether an EIS is necessary, are factintensive. The proper forum to hear such cases is before a trial court that
can take evidence and before which witnesses may appear. Congress
ought to amend section 9(e)(5) of the Act to indicate that only decisions
which are accompanied by an adequate factual record should be heard
originally in the Ninth Circuit. 63
Thus, nearly two years after BPA made its contract offers, Forelaws
on Board found itself without a court to hear its case. Originally denied
access to filing in the Ninth Circuit by that court's clerk,' Forelaws I
denied the organization access to the district court. As a result, the case
was not properly filed until after the ninety-day deadline specified in the
statute.65 BPA and some of its customers' claimed that this barred the
Ninth Circuit from hearing the case. 67 However, the appeals court ruled
that, since the failure to file within ninety days was the result of a mistake
of its clerk, it would consider the merits of the case. 68
61. Forelaws1,709 F.2d at 1312-13.
62. See Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility Dist. v. Johnson, 686 F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1982);
104 S.
Public Power Council v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 1982) rev'd, -. U.S.-.,
Ct. 2772 (1984).
63. In the alternative, Congress could indicate that the language in § 9(e)(5) of the Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 839f(e)(5) (1982)-indicating the claims under unlisted statutory provisions can be brought in the
"appropriate court" (see supra note 59)-should be interpreted to mean that district courts have
original jurisdiction, unless there is a substantially similar case pending before the Ninth Circuit.
64. The clerk rejected Forelaws' complaint because normally the Ninth Circuit has no jurisdiction
over original complaints. See Forelaws 11, 743 F.2d at 680.
65. See Northwest Power Act, §9(e)(5), 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5) (1982).
66. Martin Marietta Aluminum, the Public Power Council, and Pacific Power and Light intervened
in the case in support of BPA's position. Forelaws 1, 741 F.2d at 680.
67. BPA Brief, supra note 46, at 39-40.
68. Forelaws 11, 743 F.2d at 680. Martin Marietta also unsuccessfully alleged that Forelaws on
Board lacked standing because it could not show how BPA's contract offers injured the organization.
The court noted that (1) environmental injury is sufficient injury, (2) general allegations of potential
harm can demonstrate standing, and (3) an organization can represent the interests of injured members.
Id.
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THE MERITS
In ForelawsII, the Ninth Circuit had to decide whether BPA's contract
offer constituted "a major federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment," 69 which would, under NEPA, require the
preparation of an EIS. BPA claimed that an EIS was unwarranted because:
(1) the contracts did not produce significant environmental effects; and
(2) even if they did, the agency did not have to perform an EIS because
of time deadlines imposed by the Northwest Power Act.7" Before considering these allegations, the court gave an important judicial gloss to
the Act by emphasizing that the statute expressly required that it be
"construed in a manner consistent with applicable environmental laws. "71
Judge Schroeder, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel, characterized
the issues in the case as implicating "two of the Act's most important
objectives: a new system of contracts governing BPA's delivery of power
to its customers and an energy program for the Pacific Northwest that is
sensitive to environmental concerns." '7 2 In resolving the questions of
whether the contracts significantly affected the environment and whether
the time constraints imposed on BPA created a statutory conflict with
NEPA requirements, the court was heavily influenced by these twin
congressional objectives.
The Power Contracts' Environmental Significance
BPA claimed that its discretion in contract terms was limited only to
matters having no effect on the environment, alleging that power allocation could have no such effects.73 But the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing
BPA's own statements about the nature of its discretion, and concluding
that "the content of [contract provisions affecting the environment] is not
69. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C) (1982).
70. BPA Brief, supra note 46, at 33-38 (power allocation does not significantly affect the quality
of the human environment), 11-29 (time deadlines in Northwest Power created a statutory conflict,
making EIS preparation impossible). BPA also continued to argue that, since the Act mandated the
issuance of the contracts, no EIS was required because the agency lacked discretion not to issue the
contracts. Id. at 28-33. However, this argument was not forcefully pressed, and it was actually
closely related to BPA's argument that the contracts did not produce significant environmental effects,
since what the agency was really arguing was that any discretion it possessed over contract terms
and conditions was limited to matters of environmental irrelevance. The Ninth Circuit considered
the two arguments to be indistinguishable. See Forelaws II, 743 F.2d at 681-82.
71. ForelawsH, 743 F.2d at 680 (citing § 2 of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1982)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 681-82. BPA relied on City of Santa Clara v Andrus, 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1978)
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978), and Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976), in
support of its allegation that merely allocating power among different customers does not have
significant environmental effects.
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mandated but is clearly discretionary." 7 4 The court also rejected BPA's
suggestion that the contracts reflected only a choice of which customers
received BPA power. Instead, it ruled that the contracts "involve considerations of far greater historic and regional import and significantly
affect the environment" because of their effects on long-range regional
energy plans, energy conservation, and fish and wildlife restoration.75
Regarding the contract's potential effects on fish and wildlife, Judge
Schroeder wrote:
In the record before BPA, a great many groups suggest provisions
which would mitigate fishery damage and improve conservation efforts. As the National Marine Fisheries Service pointed out to BPA,
a major purpose of the Regional Act was to treat fish and wildlife
interests as coequal partners in the management of the Northwest
hydrosystem. Again, without an EIS, we do not know to what extent
these proposals were evaluated as feasible alternatives to the provisions eventually proposed. 76
Essentially, the court found BPA's "Environmental Report" insufficiently
detailed to inform BPA and the public of the environmental effects of the
contracts and to assess the feasibility of alternative provisions.77 As a
result, it determined that the contracts were "significant federal actions
affecting the environment," and that they therefore required an EIS unless
the time deadlines in the Northwest Power Act impliedly exempted BPA
from EIS requirements."
Implied EIS Waiver Due to Time Constraints
Having determined that BPA's contracts involved issues of environmental significance, the Ninth Circuit turned to BPA's principal defensethat the Northwest Power Act's time deadlines made it impossible for the
74. Forelaws !!, 743 F.2d at 681 (citing Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples'
Utility Dist., 104 S. Ct. 2472 (1984)); see supra note 18.
75. Forelaws 11, 743 F.2d at 682. The court stated that the policy choices which could affect
conservation incentives included rate reductions for those who conserve, conservation-related conditions, shortfall allocation plans that account for utility conservation efforts, and tiered rates. Id.
76. Id. (emphasis added) (citing comments made to BPA by the Columbia River Citizens Compact,
the Northwest Steelhead Salmon Council, the Upper Skagit Tribes, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, the Columbia River Fisherman's Protective Union, and the Washington Department of
Fisheries).
77. Id. at 681: "[BPA] did what it termed an 'Environmental Report,' a document not contemplated
by NEPA, and which did not analyze in detail any possible environmental consequences of the
contracts and ways that they might be avoided." See also id. at 685. Cf. supra notes 43-44 and
accompanying text. BPA prepared the Environmental Report not as a substitute for an EIS but to
fulfill the non-EIS requirements of NEPA. See supra note 7.
78. Forelaws II, 743 F.2d at 683. Influencing the court was the fact that BPA's "Environmental
Report" did not allege a lack of significant environmental effects; instead, it emphasized the time
constraints imposed by the Northwest Power Act as the reason not to prepare an EIS. Id. at 68283.
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agency to comply with NEPA. BPA claimed that these deadlines put the
Act in "fundamental and irreconcilable conflict" with NEPA, thus exempting the agency from preparing an EIS under the United States Supreme Court's Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic River Association
of Oklahoma decision." However, FlintRidge had involved a thirty-day
deadline, while BPA had nine months to offer its contracts, and its customers had another year to decide whether or not to accept the offer. BPA
argued that the agency did not actually have nine months to prepare the
EIS, a period of time that the Supreme Court has indicated is adequate,"0
but only thirty-two days.8 ' In Forelaws H, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
even if this restrictive time schedule was accurate, it was BPA's and not
the Act's creation. Therefore, there was no "irreconcilable statutory conflict" justifying a NEPA exemption.8"
Judge Schroeder also indicated that, in light of NEPA's directive requiring agency compliance "to the fullest extent possible," 3 coupled
with the Northwest Power Act's "clear statutory emphasis on environmental concerns," a NEPA exemption would be "inconsistent with the
congressional objectives of the Regional Act." 84 This interpretation may
well set precedent beyond the issues of this case, 5 but in Forelaws II, it
79. 426 U.S. 776, 791 (1976) (involving 30-day deadline imposed by the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act). Such NEPA "repeals by implication" are disfavored. See F SKILLERN, supra
note 18, § 2.27 (collecting cases).
80. See 426 U.S. at 780, n. 10 (an agency can produce a draft EIS in five months, and final action
can be taken within three months thereafter); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.10(d) (1984) (CEQ regulations
providing for a "fast track" EIS schedule). Owen Schmidt, attorney with BPA's Office of General
Counsel, disputes the conclusion drawn in the text, arguing that footnote 10 in the Flint Ridge
decision refers only to simple EISs written by an experienced staff. He notes that neither BPA nor
any other federal agency has prepared an EIS on twenty-year power contracts. Memorandum from
Owen Schmidt to the author at 3 (March 14, 1985).
81. BPA managed to reduce the nine months to 32 days, largely by claiming that it could not
begin to prepare an EIS until it had a "proposal for action," and that it took six months of negotiating
with its customers to arrive at a proposed course of action. See Forelaws H1,743 F.2d at 684.
82. Id. at 683, 685.
83. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2) (1982). The Ninth Circuit adopted a statement from NEPA's legislative
history indicating that this provision was aimed at ensuring strict agency compliance with NEPA.
Noncompliance would be justified only if:
the existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes
full compliance with one of the [NEPA] directives impossible.... Thus, it is the intent
of the conferees that the provision 'to the fullest extent possible' shall not be used by
any Federal agency as a means of avoiding compliance with [NEPA] directions ...
No agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing statutory
authorizations to avoid compliance.
Forelaws H1,743 F.2d at 683 (quoting from the Conference Report on NEPA, 116 CONG. REC.
39702-703 (1969) (emphasis added).
84. Conference Report on NEPA, 116 CONG. REC. 39702-703 (1969). Note that Congress, in
the opening sentences of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 (1982), directed that its purposes
and the purposes of all other statutes governing the Federal Columbia River Power System, were
"to be construed in a manner consistent with applicable environmental laws." See supra note 71
and accompanying text.
85. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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led the court to conclude that BPA's position "represents the type of
'excessively narrow construction' that NEPA['s directive of compliance
to the fullest extent possible] cautions against." 86
According to the court, a broader interpretation of its environmental
responsibilities would have led BPA to follow a schedule designed to
secure compliance with all of its statutory responsibilities. For example,
Judge Schroeder suggested that BPA need not have consumed the initial
six months negotiating with its customers, but could have employed this
time to develop a proposal to which the public could react through the
EIS process. 7 In effect, the court ruled that the overarching environmental
protection concerns of both NEPA and the Northwest Power Act"8 limited
BPA's discretion in deciding how to meet the nine-month deadline for
contract offers. Adopting a procedure that required six months of negotiations to arrive at a proposal was therefore an unreasonable interpretation
of the statute.8 9 The court noted that had BPA used the nine months to
satisfy its NEPA responsibilities and to initiate negotiations, the agency
could have continued to negotiate after the nine-month deadline, since
the statute did not require the contracts to be executed for another year."°
The injury suffered as a result of not complying with NEPA, the court
emphasized, was the failure to explore alternative courses of action that
might have better achieved all of the Northwest Power Act's purposes,
especially energy conservation and fish and wildlife preservation. 9 Because BPA failed to examine all significant alternatives, the court concluded that the agency violated NEPA. This is unsurprising because
consideration of alternatives is the heart of the NEPA process. 92 More
surprising was Judge Schroeder's conclusion that this failure also violated
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), implying a duty to examine
alternatives under the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review.9 3 This pathbreaking interpretation means that where an
agency fails to satisfy its procedural obligation to evaluate alternatives
86. Forelaws 11,743 F.2d at 684.
87. Id.
88. See supra notes 83 and 84.
89. "Giving full deference to BPA's interpretation ... we find its position is unreasonable,
particularly when viewed in light of the congressionally mandated objectives of NEPA." Forelaws
11, 743 F.2d at 684 n.5.
90. Id. (citing § 5(g)(2) of the Northwest PowerAct, 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(2)(1982)). Presumably,
if negotiations after the initial offer changed the contract terms and conditions, a supplemental EIS
would be warranted. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1984).
91. Forelaws 11,743 F.2d at 682, 684-85.
92. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (1984).
93. Under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard of review authorized by the Administrative
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), a court may require an agency's decision to
be 'based on a consideration of relevant factors.' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415, 91 S. Ct. 814, 824, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). This
requirement that an agency examine alternative courses of action has long been a part
of the APA's standard of review, see The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 92 HARV. L.REV.
70, 236-37 (1983), and has recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court. See Motor
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under NEPA, it also violates the APA's substantive standard prohibiting
arbitrary and capricious action. In short, a failure to adequately consider
alternatives constitutes a per se arbitrary administration action.
The Remedy
Although the court ordered BPA to prepare an EIS, it refused to enjoin
the operation of the contracts pending its preparation. While the presumed
remedy for a NEPA violation in the Ninth Circuit is injunctive relief,94
Forelaws II indicates that this presumption can be overcome by time
deadlines in another statute. Here, the Northwest Power Act's directive
that executed power contracts be in place twenty-one months after its
enactment created a "clear tension" between an injunction invalidating
the contracts and this deadline. Accordingly, Judge Schroeder determined
injunctive relief to be inappropriate.95 The court was convinced that Forelaws on Board gained an effective remedy without injunctive relief, since
the contracts which were negotiated contained provisions contemplating
amendments. 96 Noting that the contracts envisioned a flexible, "ongoing,
changing relationship among BPA, its customers, and the public interest
represented by the Regional Council established under the Act," the Ninth
Circuit concluded that "only a full environmental impact statement will
inform BPA, its customers, the public, and the Regional Council of all
the environmental
consequences of the contracts and serve as a guide to
97
future actions."
Vehicle Manuf. Ass'n. v. State Farm Insur. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 77
L.Ed.2d 443 (1983).
Forelaws II, 743 F.2d at 685.
Judge Schroeder's conclusion that BPA's failure to evaluate alternative courses of action was
"arbitrary and capricious" under the APA is part of a tidal wave of recent cases in which the federal
courts, especially the District of Columbia Circuit, have increasingly declared numerous administrative actions, particularly attempts to deregulate, to be arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Garland,
Deregulationand JudicialReview, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 540 n. 185 (1985) (citing fourteen cases
since 1983); Middleton, Deregulation Hits a Roadblock, NATL. L.J. at I (Sept. 9, 1985).
94. Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark, 747 F.2d 1240, 1250 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Forelaws II,
743 F.2d at 685 (noting that an injunction is "the most common judicial response to a NEPA
violation"); 743 F.2d at 685 (citing American Motorcyclist Ass'n. v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965-66
(9th Cir. 1983)).
95. Forelaws I1, 743 F.2d at 685.
96. Id. at 686.
97. Id. The court specifically noted that BPA's Environmental Report was "not a sufficiently
detailed analysis for informing BPA and the public of the environmental consequences of the choices
represented by the contracts." Id. "Even less informative," according to the court, "was the Finding
of No Significant Impact (FONSI) which BPA filed in connection with the contract amendments of
October 1982." Id. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 18 ANADROMOUS FiSH LAW MEMO 6 (May
1982) (describing these amendments, which would enable greater reservoir drawdowns by authorizing
"Economic Shifts" of "Finn Energy Load Carry Capability"). But the court refused to order a
separate EIS on the amendments, since they weren't challenged within the statutorily-required 90day period. Forelaws 11, 743 F.2d at 686 n.6. However, since it is not clear that the operations
envisioned by these amendments have in fact been instituted, there is no reason why the environmental
consequences from these operations should not be evaluated in the EIS that the court ordered.
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CONCLUSION

Forelaws II is an important decision, with potential ramifications considerably beyond its facts. On the heels of the Rock Island Dam decision,98
the case clarifies the Ninth Circuit's view that the Northwest Power Act,
like the Alaska Lands Act, 99 contemplates administrative decisionmaking
that is sensitive to environmental concerns. "0And, like the Rock Island
Dam case, Forelaws H shows that the Ninth Circuit is quite reluctant to
accept agency interpretations of organic statutes that inhibit compliance
with NEPA. I°1 Particularly noteworthy in Forelaws II was the court's
sensitivity to NEPA's role in fostering public involvement and interagency
coordination." 2 The case may well have turned on the substantial opposition that BPA's proposed contract terms engendered, including opposition from federal and state agencies and Indian tribes."'
In the wake of its substantive demise," NEPA's legacy will depend
upon how zealously the courts protect the pluralism generated by its
procedures. The Ninth Circuit seems prepared to ensure that NEPA realizes some of its potential to democratize agency decisionmaking. °5
Moreover, the ForelawsII court may revive interest in NEPA's ability to
affect substantive agency decisionmaking. If a failure to adequately consider alternatives is an arbitrary administrative action,' ° 6 it seems a small
step to suggest that choosing a particular alternative may also be arbitrary
in light of the environmental record reflected in an EIS.
98. Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984) (FERC ordered to perform an
EIS before relicensing the Rock Island Dam); see NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 26 ANADROMOUS
FISH LAW MEMO 5-7 (July 1984); Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes v. FERC: Three Strikes Against the
Federal Hydroelectric Czar and Some Suggested Amendments to the Federal Power Act, 10 HARV.
ENvrL. L. REv. no. 1 (forthcoming 1986).
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3103 et seq.; see Southeast Alaska Conservation Council v. Watson, 697 F.2d
1305, 1310 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alaska Lands Act "should be interpreted in light of its underlying
protective purposes...").
100. Forelaws II, 683 F.2d at 683 ("clear statutory emphasis on environmental concerns").
101. In the Rock Island Dam case, Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert denied, -__U.S.-., 105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985), the court refused to allow FERC to construe
section 15(a) of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 808(a) (1982), to permit a looser standard of
administrative review in the case of a relicensing than in the case of an initial licensing.
102. See Forelaws H1,743 F.2d at 682, 685.
103. Supplying critical comments on BPA's draft contracts were the Columbia River Citizens
Compact, the Columbia River Fisherman's Protective Union, the Environmental Protection Agency,
Fair Electric Rates Now, the National Marine Fisheries Service, the Natural Resources Defense
Council, the Northwest Steelhead Salmon Council, the Oregon Department of Energy, the Upper
Skagit Tribes, and the Washington Department of Fisheries. See id. at 682 nn.3-4.
104. Strykers' Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
105. I believe that a major function of the judiciary in reviewing administrative environmental
decisionmaking is to encourage widespread participation and pluralistic debate. See Blumm, Environmental Decision Making, JudicialReview and the Democratization of the Leviathan State: Some
Comments on the Huffman/Funk Colloquy, ADVOCATE, at 10 (Spring 1985) ( Lewis & Clark Law
School Alumni Magazine).
106. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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ForelawsII also contains lessons for entities with important Northwest
Power Act implementation responsibilities such as BPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Northwest Power Planning
Council, and the public. First, by determining that NEPA requires BPA
to prepare an EIS on its power sale contracts, the court read NEPA's
directive of procedural compliance "to the fullest extent possible" to
require the agency to demonstrate a "fundamental and irreconcilable
conflict" with a statutory provision. 1°7 Consequently, Judge Schroeder
refused to allow BPA to create administrative roadblocks to NEPA compliance. If this represents a harbinger of the Ninth Circuit's pending
interpretation of the provision in the Northwest Power Act requiring
compliance with the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program' "to
the fullest extent practicable," the court will have helped to clarify a
critically important statutory ambiguity inhibiting effective implementation of a program promising significant restoration of the Columbia's
anadromous fish runs.'°9
Second, the case is further evidence that, in interpreting the Northwest
Power Act, the Ninth Circuit will turn to the statute's purposes to help
resolve ambiguities in its directives. Because of the unmistakable congressional intent to have the Act interpreted consistently with environmental
laws such as NEPA, 1 ° the court refused to accept BPA's claim that
administrative inconvenience justified an implied waiver of NEPA compliance. Third, it seems apparent that, due to the "coequal partnership"
the Northwest Power Act envisioned between fish and wildlife protection
107. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
108. This program was authorized by section 4(h) of the Northwest Power Act to protect and
restore Columbia Basin fish and wildlife, particularly anadromous fish, to the extent adversely affected
by the development and operations of Columbia Basin hydroelectric projects. See NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, as amended (1984) [hereinafter
cited as COLUMBIA BASIN PROGRAM].

Section 4(h)(l1)(A)(ii) of the Northwest Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §839b(h)(ll)(A)(ii) (1982),
requires federal water management agencies such as FERC, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and
the Bureau of Reclamation to take into account the Columbia Basin and Wildlife Program "at each
relevant stage of [their] decisionmaking processes to the fullest extent practicable."
109. Section 1304(a)(5) of the Columbia Basin Program, supranote 108, interpreted this provision
to require implementation of program measures or explanations (with supporting information) "of
why implementation is physically, legally or otherwise impractical, including all possible allowances
available to permit program implementation." Unfortunately, agencies like BPA, FERC, and the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers disagree, alleging that § 4(h)(I l)(A)(ii) of the Act imposes no
mandatory duties on them. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INSTITUTE, 30 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW
MEMO 7-11 (1985). The Ninth Circuit has been asked to interpret the statutory provision in a suit
filed by the National Wildlife Federation contesting FERC's failure to assess the cumulative effects
of numerous proposed hydroelectric projects in Idaho's Salmon River Basin. The Wildlife Federation
alleges this failure not only violates the Northwest Power Act but also NEPA and the Federal Power
Act. National Wildlife Federation v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n., No. 84-7325 (9th Cir.).
See Blumm, Implementing the Parity Promise: An Evaluation ofthe Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife
Program, 14 ENvTL. L. 277, 336-37 (1984).
110. See supra text accompanying note 71.
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and power production,'1 ' BPA's obligations to investigate and explore
feasible alternatives increase."'
Fourth, the decision reflects a healthy skepticism of BPA, an agency
which has consistently demonstrated a bias against meaningful fish and
wildlife measures." 3 Long ago "captured" by its utility and industrial
customers," 4 BPA has been slow to see that a fundamental purpose of
the Northwest Power Act is to open up its decisionmaking processes and
make it responsible to a broader constituency. "' In this case, the court
recognized that BPA's attempt to evade its NEPA responsibilities was
tantamount to refusing to treat long underrepresented fish and wildlife
and energy conservation interests as the "coequal partners" Congress
envisioned.
Finally, the case reflects considerable optimism regarding the role of
another key implementor of the Northwest Power Act, the Northwest
Power Planning Council. The court even referred to the Council as representing "the public interest."" 6 Nevertheless, it is far from clear whether
the Council will seize the opportunities presented by the court-ordered
EIS to make BPA rigorously explore alternatives to existing Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) operating assumptions," 7 which
might inform the Council of feasible alternative system operating assumptions that could supply greater fishery protection." 8
111. Forelaws 11, 743 F.2d at 682 ("a major purpose of the Regional Act was to treat fish and
wildlife interests as coequal partners in management of the Northwest hydrosystem"); see also
105 S.
Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) cert denied _U. S.Ct. 2358 (1985) (fish and wildlife protection stands "on an equal footing" with power generation).
112. Forelaws 11, 743 F.2d at 682 (noting the necessity of evaluating feasible alternatives).
Requiring BPA to explore all feasible alternatives is consistent with the legislative history of the
Northwest Power Act, which indicated Congress' expectation that power managers could "devise
effective and imaginative measures" to protect and restore fish and wildlife without jeopardizing the
region's power supply." House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 976,
pt.l, 96th CONG., 2d SEsS. at 47 (1980).
113. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 109, at 323-27, 352 n.312; NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST.,
24 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 2-10 (Mar. 1984); id., 27 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 9-11
(Sept. 1984).
114. See, e.g., Hydroelectric Heritage, supra note 2, at 206-07 (describing BPA as a regional
chamber of commerce).
115. See id. at 222-23; see also Blumm, Risk Management and Northwest Electric Power Planning: Some Lessons from the Rearview Mirror, 13 ENvTL. L. 739, 762-63 (1983).
116. Forelaws 11, 743 F.2d at 686.
117. For an overview of these operation assumptions, including an explanation of "critical water
year" planning, see NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 18 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO (May 1982);
see also J. Bowler, Coordinated Power Production on the Pacific Northwest (University of Washington, Master's degree thesis) (1982).
118. For example, the Council rejected Snake River fish flows recommended by the Columbia
Basin Indian Tribes as infeasible, although it was not very clear as to why. See Blumm, supra note
109, at 298-301. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the Council adequately fulfilled this responsibility
by supporting BPA's position in an amicus brief in this case. The Council may have supported BPA
out of concern that doing an EIS on the contracts might set an unfortunate precedent regarding BPA's
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Given BPA's track record and uncertainty regarding the Council's po-

sition, the Northwest public must play an active role in formulating and
evaluating BPA's EIS. It is imperative that the EIS be properly "scoped." 1 19 Among the questions that must be addressed are, of course, those

suggested by the court, such as why it is not feasible to incorporate into
BPA's contracts the fishery protection conditions suggested by the Na-

tional Marine Fisheries Service, and the conservation provisions suggested by the Natural Resources Defense Council and others."'o
But other unresolved questions should not be overlooked, especially
those involving FCRPS operations. For example, do the contracts influence FCRPS operations in ways that might affect fishery flows?' Are
there contract provisions that might facilitate such flows, including making feasible the Snake River flows which the region's fish and wildlife
agencies and Indian tribes believe are biologically necessary? 2 What is
the relationship between secondary energy sales and the implementation
of the Council's Water Budget?' 23 How does this relationship reflect
"equitable treatment" for fish and wildlife, a Northwest Power Act standard that is judicially enforceable?' 2 4 Can "Firm Energy Load Carrying
Capability Shifts,""'2 made for the benefit of BPA's industrial customers,
produce extraordinary reservoir drafts at Hungry Horse, Libby, and Dwor-

shak Dams in the autumn months without consideration of their potential
implementation of the Columbia Basin Program, supra note 108, a precedent that BPA could invoke
to delay program implementation. However, there were a number of other means by which such a
result could have been avoided. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 19 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW
MEMO 11-12 (Sept. 1982).
119. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (1984) (Council on Environmental Quality regulations describing an
"early on open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the
significant issues related to a proposed action").
120. See supra notes 52-53, 75-76 and accompanying text.
121. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 27 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 9-10 (Sept. 1984)
(assertion of Water Budget Managers, see infra note 123, that the Corps and BPA have elevated
reservoir refill and secondary energy sales over fish flows).
122. See supra note 118.
123. "The Water Budget," established by § 304 of the Columbia Basin Program, supra note 108,
is a volume of approximately four and a half million acre-feet of water made available to representatives of fish and wildlife agencies and Indian tribes (i.e., "Water Budget Managers") during April
15 to June 15 each year to facilitate downstream juvenile fish migration. Essentially, the Water
Budget functions to augment flows to simulate the lost spring freshet, now largely stored behind
multi-purpose dams, on which juvenile anadromous fish historically depended to reach the ocean.
Water Budget flows come from flows which dam operators would otherwise save to generate electricity later in the year. Although an innovative concept, the Water Budget has encountered numerous
implementation difficulties. See NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 30 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO
8-10 (June 1985).
124. Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) cert denied
_-_U.S.-.,
105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985).
. 125. See BPA FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 4-12 to 4-17 (explaining "FELCC
Shifts" and "advance energy sales" and some of their potential environmental effects).
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effects on Water Budget flows?' 26 Are there contract provisions which
would facilitate implementation of the Council's Water Budget?
If these questions are to be addressed in BPA's EIS,1 27 they almost
certainly will have to be asked by the public or the Northwest Power
Planning Council. Unless BPA is prodded to take a hard look at the
relationship between its power sales, FCRPS operations, and fish and
wildlife protection, the opportunities presented by Forelaws H will, unfortunately, remain unfulfilled.

126. See Blumm, supra note 109, at 295-96, n.77 (pointing out that such "shifts" are considered
by BPA to be for the purpose of serving firm power loads, which may give them priority over fish
flows); see also NATURAL RESOURCES LAW INST., 18 ANADROMOUS FISH LAW MEMO 6 (May 1982).
127. On March 4, 1985, BPA issued a Notice of Intent to prepare the EIS Judge Schroeder
ordered. In response, sixteen commentators made suggestions concerning the range of actions,
alternatives, and impacts to be addressed in the EIS. "Scoping" meetings (see supra notes 32, 119)
were scheduled for June 1985. Letter from Roy B. Fox, Environmental Coordinator, Bonneville
Power Administration to author (May 15, 1985).

